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BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE 
Urban public transport fares shall meet a number of – often contradictory – needs and 
requirements. Budgetary constraints and reduced subsidies, dividends to owners, 
service improvements and so on pull public transport fares up. On the other hand, 
objectives such as social inclusion, fairness, internalisation of external benefits and 
corrections for under-priced private transport pull in the direction of lower fares. 
 
During the period of 1986 to 1999, the 7 largest Norwegian cities experienced 42 
percent cuts in subsidies, in real terms (Carlquist and Fearnley 2001). Figure 1 
illustrates what happened in the city of Trondheim during this period. The operators' 
dependence on fare revenues increased from around 50 percent of operating costs to 
nearly 100 percent. Similar developments can be found in a number of European 
cities (Maretope 2002, Higginson 2002). Lisbon stands out as one of the European 
cities with the largest subsidy cuts during the 1990s. 
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Figure 1: Developments in the allocation of cost recovery between subsidies and fare 
revenues in Trondheim 1986 and 1999. 
 
Such subsidy cuts reflect to some degree efficiency gains in the industry, but have 
evidently also transferred costs from the public purse to the passengers who 
experience increasing fares and/or reduced service levels. Importantly in our respect, 
the subsidy cuts have increased the importance of user payments for the financing of 
urban public transport. In Trondheim, real fares rose by 29 percent during this period. 
 
Subsequently, the question is: 
In the light of subsidy cuts, how can urban public transport increase passenger 
receipts and at the same time maintain passenger numbers and market shares? 
 
General fare policies rarely address issues of efficient cost recovery, modal shares and 
welfare loss adequately. An intention with this paper is therefore to show how fare 
systems can improve social welfare in situations where operators face budget 
constraints due to less-than-optimal subsidy levels, i.e, how public transport fare 
systems can be used more effectively to cover operating costs and at the same time to 
maintain market shares and/or service levels. 
 
In the following it is not taken into consideration the fact that public transport fares 
are also tools for other objectives, such as social policy. Neither do we look at supply-
side effects, second-best considerations of under-priced substitute services (e.g. 
private car) and the like. Further, we limit our focus to urban public transport. 
 
The objective is to explain some theory which shows that public transport fares can be 
used effectively to recover costs and at the same time provide more benefits to 
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operators and passengers. A further objective is to show examples of real world 
applications of this theory. 
 
This paper is an elaboration of Fearnley (2004) and focuses more on patronage growth 
opportunities and on the effects of different pricing strategies. 
 
COST-BASED PRICING AND THE PEAK 
A necessary condition for (Pareto) optimal resource allocation is that prices equal 
marginal costs. A particular problem with respect to this is the fact that operating 
costs normally will vary across the day. Marginal costs can be very high during peak 
periods, as the high demand requires investments in increased capacity. These costs 
should be allocated to a relatively small number of passengers, viz. those who travel 
during the peak periods and on sections of the routes where capacity is at its limit 
(design capacity demand). 
 
Marginal costs are relatively stable and low as long as passenger numbers are well 
below the public transport system's capacity. In the short run, however, there is 
limited room for increases in capacity to meet increased design capacity demand. 
Hence, short run marginal costs (SRMC) increase dramatically (or even infinitely) 
when demand exceeds capacity. In addition, social SRMC increases as a result of 
passengers' disbenefit of crowding. 
 
In the longer run, however, system capacity can be adjusted with new investments, 
and there is no sharp increase in marginal costs at a certain level of demand. Marginal 
costs are still higher during the rush periods than off-peak. The reason is, i.a. the fact 
that bus fleet and personnel cannot be utilised as efficiently to serve rush peaks as 
they can outside the peak periods. For example, within the period between 6am and 
9am in the morning there can be a very sharp top limited to, say 30 minutes. Much of 
the bus fleet and personnel that are used to serve these passengers can only be used 
for one single roundtrip. Figure 2 is a stylised illustration of how extra buses and 
personnel are left unutilised between the peak periods. 
 
In sum, and regardless of whether our time horizon is long or short, peak passengers 
are associated with higher marginal costs than off-peak passengers. Peak fares should 
therefore cost more than off-peak fares. 
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Figure 2: Stylised example of how service levels are adjusted across the operating 
hours of a day in order to serve rush hour demand. 
 
An important feature of marginal cost pricing is the fact that passengers shall 
experience that each trip they make is associated with a cost. Cost can be high (during 
peak) or low (off-peak and with scale economies), but it will never be exactly zero. If 
a fare policy objective is to link fare levels to actual costs, we must conclude that 
season tickets (day, week, monthly etc. passes) are not associable with efficient 
pricing.The problem with season tickets is more acute during the peak periods than at 
other times. Season tickets are especially attractive for the regular passengers, like 
those travelling to and from work and school. At the same time, these types of trips 
represent a major part of the design capacity demand. This leads to a situation where 
the most expensive passengers travel on highly rebated season tickets and pay zero 
marginal fare. This self-contradictory practice is widespread. Such a pricing strategy 
gives passengers a wrong signal and leads to excessive demand for public transport at 
times when the costs are particularly high. This is why unrestricted season tickets are 
not associable with efficient pricing.  
 
This argument can be moderated. Passengers travelling at times of the day and at 
sections of the routes where there is ample capacity probably incurs a cost that is 
closer to zero than to the cost of a typical single ticket. Season ticket can be a practical 
pricing tool for this kind of trips. This means that season tickets must be limited in 
time (off-peak only) or in geography (low-demand sections and low-demand travel 
directions in the network). 
 
A pragmatic approach to cost-based pricing is some kind of peak pricing. With peak 
pricing fares are higher during the peak and/or lower during off-peak periods – in 
other words fare differentiation by time of day. Such a system will either 
 
• let the passengers who incur low costs on the system (e.g. off-peak 
passengers) travel on heavily rebated tickets, or 
• apply an extra charge on peak demand, or 
0
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• a combination of off-peak rebates and peak surcharges. 
 
Rebates outside rush hours are the most publicly acceptable way of time-differentiated 
fares. Such rebates may be sufficient to transfer passengers from the rush periods and 
to periods with spare capacity. The rebates will also attract new passengers. The total 
effect would be more passengers that are less costly to serve. 
 
Off-peak rebates mean for example that certain cheaper ticket types only are valid 
after, say 9am and during weekends. Existing and new types of concessionary fares 
can be subject to such restrictions. Although such restrictions on e.g. old age 
pensioners' concessionary fares are controversial in many countries, it has become a 
standard way of time differentiation in most of the UK.    
 
Off-peak rebates will not – especially in the short run – increase the operator's total 
revenues. Rather, the average ticket revenue per passenger (or average fare) will fall. 
This fact provides new opportunities for operators whose overall fare levels are 
regulated according to a price index (for example RPI-X regulation). The off-peak 
rebates will give room for peak surcharges. Later, we shall see that with a 
combination of peak surcharges and off-peak rebates, the average fare level need not 
increase, and that total patronage and total revenue may well increase with such 
combinations of rebates and surcharges. 
 
Peak fare surcharges will encourage more passengers to change their trip timing. 
Although most peak passengers are inflexible w.r.t. trip timing, there will always be a 
number of them who react to such price stimuli (see e.g. Jong et al. 2001). And 
because most passengers have no alternative, ticket revenues will increase. 
 
When peak and off-peak fares are regarded coherently, i.e. when peak fares are higher 
that off-peak fares, then a number of efficiency gains can be obtained: 
 
• Passengers realise that their trips have different costs to the operator (and other 
passengers in terms of crowding, delay) depending on their trip timing 
• Some passengers will change the timing of their trips to periods where they are 
less costly to serve, hence reducing total operating costs. 
• Off-peak rebates increase passenger numbers and bring the average fare level 
down 
• Peak surcharges increase operating revenues 
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• Off-peak rebates provide affordable services and hence improved mobility to 
the less affluent  
• Average fare levels need not increase – they may even fall. 
It is important to add a caveat relating to the fact that alternative modes of transport 
tend to be priced below their marginal social costs. This fact is particularly apparent 
for private car use during rush periods. Modal shift from public transport to private 
car, resulting from peak fare surcharges, will therefore have adverse effects on society 
as a whole. Ideally, therefore, car use should also be subject to peak pricing e.g. 
through time differentiated road pricing. 
PRICE DIFFERENTIATION 
Price differentiation is not only a tool for profit maximisation, but also a means to 
achieve efficient levels of service and efficient resource allocation. The starting point 
of price differentiation is a thorough understanding of passengers' response to changes 
in price - as opposed to peak pricing where prices are determined by variations in 
costs only. 
 
Varian (1996) argued that under price differentiation, there will be a welfare loss if 
total production falls or stagnates, compared to the production under uniform pricing. 
A necessary, but not sufficient condition for welfare gain is therefore that production 
increases with price differentiation. 
 
Price differentiation is often associated with yield management. The aim of yield 
management is to maximise profits by charging different prices to different groups of 
passengers. The least price sensitive passengers are charged the highest price.  
 
Ramsey pricing is based on the same principles as yield management and price 
differentiation, but is used as a second best pricing strategy to minimise the welfare 
loss caused by a budget constraint (e.g. due to insufficient subsidies). Fares are being 
differentiated between different market segments according to their elasticities of 
demand, and according to variations in marginal costs. 
 
The case for Ramsey pricing is as follows. Let us regard a market with one service 
(bus), before we consider an operator who offers different services. We assume that 
the price, p and total costs, TC are functions of quantity: 
 
p = p(Q) and TC = c(Q)  
 
In addition there is a budget constraint: 
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π = k.  
Optimal pricing means that we maximise social welfare (SW), subject to the budget 
constraint: 
Max SW such that pQ - c(Q) = k 
 ⇓ 
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From (b2) we get: 
(b4) ελ
λ 1
1
⋅+
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MCp
  ,   ε is the elasticity of demand w.r.t. price 
 
In other words, optimal second-best solution is when the proportionate mark-up of 
price over marginal cost equals the inverse of the price elasticity. In other words: the 
more price sensitive market the lower the mark-up. From (b2) we get: 
 
 (b5)  λ−=−
−
MCMR
MCp
, 
 
so that λ is the marginal benefit in SW of relaxing the budget constraint. We see that 
marginal cost pricing, P=MC gives λ=0 and no further benefit can be gained. 
 
Baumol and Bradford (1970) is the traditional reference for optimal pricing when a 
monopolist who supplies 2 goods (e.g. peak and off-peak services) faces a budget 
constraint:  
 
We have  MRi = pi + xi dpi/dpxi,   (MR = marginal revenue) 
 
and derive   pi - MCi = (1+ λ) (MRi - MCi), λ constant. 
 
and  (b6) 
ii
ii
p
MCp
ελ
λ 11 ⋅+=−  ,  because εi = -pi/xi(dxi/dpi) 
 
This is the usual representation of Ramsey pricing. When prices deviate from 
marginal costs because of a budget constraint, P>MC, then we see from equation (b6) 
that efficient pricing means a proportional mark-up of prices is in inverse ratio with 
the price elasticity of the markets. From (b6) we see that if all markets have the same 
elasticities then the proportional mark-up of prices over MC should be the same in all 
markets. The optimal mark-up depends on own and cross elasticities. 
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From (b4) we derive the general pricing rule for two substitute services: 
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If ε2 is large and ε1 is small (in absolute terms) then there should be a large 
proportional mark-up in market 1 and a small mark-up in market 2. For substitutes, 
max SW requires: 
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(b8) shows that the optimal mark-up increases,  
 
the tougher the budget constraint, i.e. the bigger λ, for example due to insufficient 
subsidies 
 
the smaller the price elasticity – price insensitive demand should, for example, be 
charged more 
 
the bigger the cross price elasticity. A large cross elasticity reduces δp2/δp1, and hence 
the mark-up must increase for (b8) to hold 
 
Although Ramsey pricing is a welfare maximising approach, it is rarely applied in 
local public transport. There are several reasons for that. Firstly, it assumes detailed 
knowledge of cost and demand structures, which are usually difficult to obtain. 
Secondly, regulating authorities are not always happy with great variations in fares. 
Thirdly, the correct "Ramsey price" can in some instances be a very large mark-up 
over marginal cost (see Nilsson 1992). Fourthly, Ramsey pricing becomes very 
difficult when external costs and benefits are present. Baumol (1995) argued however 
that these effects are likely to be relatively small. 
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IMPLEMENTING PRICE DIFFERENTIATION 
Pigou (1929: 275f) described ways in which a monopolist can maximise revenues, 
and divided between 3 degrees of price discrimination (which is the same as price 
differentiation).  
 
First degree (perfect) price discrimination is when the operator knows all consumers' 
willingness to pay and is able to charge this. For obvious reasons this is not relevant 
for public transport. 
 
Second degree price discrimination is when prices depend on quantities sold (e.g. 
multiple journey tickets, season tickets, zone systems) or on quality (e.g. 1st and 2nd 
class, express services). However, every passenger who purchases the same quantity 
and/or quality pays the same fare. The operator doesn't need to know each passenger's 
willingness to pay, or their demand elasticity, but the passengers choose themselves 
the price/quality combination that suits them best (self-selection). 
 
Third degree price discrimination is when different groups of passengers are charged 
differently, and according to their elasticity of demand. Student and old age pensioner 
concessionary fares are examples of this. It is necessary to establish clear rules which 
define the different segments so that passengers cannot shop around between different 
rebates. Age, gender, student ID cards and so on are such indisputable criteria.  
 
If total revenues are to be increased under third degree discrimination, then the 
rebates/surcharges must be seen in relation to the demand segments' price elasticity. 
Revenues will increase if elastic demand segments - i.e. those whose elasticity is 
above unity - are given rebates, and if fare levels are increased to inelastic demand 
segments. 
 
What do we know about different passenger segments' price elasticity? The following 
are some typical findings, based on sources like Litman (2004) and Balcombe et al. 
(2004). Note, however, that demand studies should be undertaken in individual cities 
before a differentiated fare structure is determined. 
 
• Peak passengers are the least price sensitive, as their freedom to choose trip 
timing and transport mode is limited by school and work hour requirements, 
congestion, parking restrictions and so on. 
• Leisure trips are more price sensitive because they are more flexible as to whether 
to travel or not, where, when and why, and with which mode. 
• Children and youth are more price sensitive than adults. 
• Car ownership increases price elasticity because it offers an alternative. 
• Low-income groups are the least price sensitive. Although the fare level is 
particularly important for them, they tend not to have a real choice.  
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• Price elasticity is higher on the very short and on the very long trips. Walking and 
cycling are alternatives to the short public transport trips while the car is an 
alternative on longer trips. 
It is important in this respect to consider differences between long and short-term 
elasticities. Long-term elasticities tend to be 1.5 to 3 times higher than the short-term 
effects (Goodwin, 1988, Preston, 1998, Dargay and Hanly, 2001). This means that it 
may prove profitable in the longer run to reduce fares to some submarkets whose long 
run demand elasticities are greater than one in absolute terms. 
 
One should be aware that there are undesirable aspects of price differentiation too. 
Firstly, it may seem unjust that some people receive rebates while others pay full 
price. Secondly, fares may deviate largely from marginal costs and be difficult to 
explain to the public. Thirdly, the potentially large number of different prices for the 
same services may itself be a barrier to travel by public transport. There is in other 
words a trade off between simple and "fair" fare systems, and efficient welfare 
maximising price differentiation. We know from other industries – not least from rail 
and aviation – that a large degree of differentiation can be perceived as attractive by 
the market. Whether you double the price on express bus services or dump prices on 
lower quality bus services, the result may in fact be more satisfied passengers. The 
former offers superior comfort and maybe even prestige, whilst the latter offers 
affordable services for the average citizen. 
 
 
 
PATRONAGE GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES 
So far we have focused on strategies to increase revenues only. This is only a partial 
solution to our problem statement of increasing passenger receipts and at the same 
time maintaining passenger numbers and market shares. Great care is needed if fare 
changes shall not lead to either passenger loss or revenue loss.  
 
A condition for fare reductions to increase patronage and maintain or increase 
revenues is that demand is elastic, i.e. above unity. This is generally not the case for 
aggregate public transport demand, but may apply to particular market segments. 
Section 3.2 above listed some circumstances under which demand is more elastic. 
Figure 3 is copied from Balcombe et al (2004). It shows that public transport demand 
is in fact elastic in some few special cases. Although the authors are not explicit as to 
the interpretation of figure 3, it seems the largest elasticity values refer to non-
conditional elasticities. Such elasticity estimates indicate change between different 
ticket types or different public transport modes rather than patronage growth per se. 
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Figure 3 illustrates the importance of building up markets over time. The average 
long-run bus fare elasticity in the UK is unity, -1. This means that fares reductions are 
likely to increase demand such that total revenue and patronage are unaffected or even 
increased. Rebates that are targeted towards more elastic demand segments are even 
more likely to increase patronage and revenues in the long run. This applies e.g. to 
leisure travellers, children or elderly and those travelling short distances. 
 
 
Figure 3: Range and mean values of elasticities. Source: Copy of Balcombe et al 
(2004) figure 3.1. 
 
Table 1 puts together some evidence (again extracted from Balcombe et al (2004)) of 
elastic demand. The size of the evidence is not striking, but indicates that elastic 
demand (segments) can be found in urban public transport. 
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Table 1: Evidence of elastic public transport demand. Source: References cited in 
Balcombe et al (2004) appendix 6 
Source Demand segment Elasticity 
Preston 1998 UK, Rail PTE area C Travelcard 
UK, Bus, adults, prepaid tickets, medium run 
-1.02 
-0.74 ± 0.39 
Gilbert and Jalilian 1991 UK, Bus, long run, without long run symmetry -1.32 
White 1981 UK, Bus, Morpeth, off-peak, inter-urban -1.00 
Fowkes, Sherwood and Nash 1992 London, suburban rail, leisure -1.5 
 
Another strategy to increase total demand is to "subsidise" fare reductions to some 
passengers by marking up fares paid by others. Fare reductions should be granted to 
the more elastic demand segments and mark-ups should be paid by the less elastic 
demand segments. The argument is in line with Webster and Bly (eds. 1980) who 
stated that  
"…when the average fare per passenger in a graduated system is 
equal to the flat fare, the graduated system is likely to attract both 
more passengers and more revenue." (p 223)  
and 
"Thus, if fares are reduced in off-peak periods and increased in 
peak periods then for the same overall revenue it will generally be 
possible to attract more passengers in total." (p 225) 
Table 2 is a thought example of how this can be applied. It shows the effect of a peak 
fare increase combined with an off-peak fare reduction. The initial demand (demand 
0) is 70 peak and 100 off-peak passengers, and the initial fare (P0) is 1 throughout the 
day. In period 1 the peak fare is increased to 1.30 and off-peak fare is reduced to 0.80. 
With peak and off-peak demand elasticities of -0.2 and -0.5 respectively, total revenue 
and total patronage are increased in period 1. Total revenue increases by 3 percent and 
patronage by 5 percent. And, interestingly, the average fare falls by one percent. This 
example shows that deviations from flat or uniform fare structures can have very 
attractive effects. 
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Table 2: Demand and revenue effects in a thought example of peak fare surcharge 
and off-peak rebates. Peak and off-peak demand elasticities are assumed to be -0.2 
and -0.5, respectively. Changes from period 0 to period 1.  
  Peak Off-Peak Aggregate 
P0 1 1  
P1 1,3 0,8  
Demand 0 70 100 170 
Demand 1 66 112 178 
Revenue 0 70 100 170 
Revenue 1 86 89 176 
Average fare 0   1,00 
Average fare 1   0,99 
 
A final strategy which will increase revenues and patronage is to see public transport 
fares in relation to policies directed towards car use. Car restrictions and proper road 
user charges and parking fees will increase public transport market share and local 
government revenues. Such policies are not, however, within the scope of this paper. 
 
 
EXAMPLES OF PRICING STRATEGIES ASSOCIABLE 
WITH EFFICIENT PRICING 
By efficient pricing strategies, we mean fare policies that are applied in order to 
increase traffic revenues and to maintain or increase service levels and patronage, 
despite insufficient public subsidies. This means that the fare structure minimises 
welfare loss due to a budget constraint and that they reflect and combine cost and 
demand structures. 
 
Most of the examples below were recorded spring 2003. No effort has been made to 
update the information or to convert fare levels into a common currency. This is 
because fare levels change continuously and will most likely have changed by the 
time this is printed anyway. More importantly is the fact that our point of interest is 
the fare structure and not the exact fare levels. 
 
TIME DIFFERENTIATION AND SEGMENTATION 
Time-differentiated fares are common in a large number of countries. The basic 
principles are more or less the same as those presented below.  
 
In Sweden, Stockholm has a monthly weekend card that is valid every weekend of the 
month. Further, youths aged 6-18 are offered the cheap "Wild card" which is valid 
after 4pm on weekdays and during weekends – a combination of time differentiation 
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and segmentation. And in Gothenburg, most season tickets have two prices: one for 
travel any time of the day and one for low traffic periods. 
 
Throughout England bus saver tickets are usually valid only after the morning peak. 
In Manchester, for example, a 2-zone return ticket on the Metrolink costs £2.20 
during rush and £1.80 off- peak. Also the senior citizen's concessionary fares are 
usually only available after 9am or 9:30am.  
 
Time differentiation is widespread also in America. As an example of off-peak rebates 
the one day travel pass in Washington DC is only valid after 9.30 am on weekdays. 
Other season tickets have limited validity during the peak hours. 
Surcharges on higher standard 
There is ample evidence, e.g. from stated preference surveys, that passengers place a 
value, and are willing to pay extra, for higher standard public transport. That is faster, 
more frequent, more comfortable etc. services. 
 
The different means of public transport to and from Oslo airport are priced differently. 
The high quality Oslo Airport Express train is about twice as expensive as the 
ordinary, scheduled trains; NOK 150 as opposed to NOK 72. The airport buses, which 
offer high quality in terms of accessibility, availability and a dense network, cost 
NOK 100. 
 
Stockholm introduced a high standard bus service in 1990. It offered superior 
comfort, standard, and speed. Passengers could reserve seats on this bus service by 
paying about twice the price of an ordinary monthly pass. About 25 seats per bus 
departure were reserved this way and the scheme was judged to be relatively 
successful. 
 
In New York the ordinary metro or bus tickets cost $1.50 whilst express buses charge 
$3. Similarly, there are two monthly passes which cost $63 and $120, respectively. 
And in Washington DC the ordinary fare is $1.10 whilst express buses cost $3. 
 
In Singapore, buses with air condition are charged higher than buses without. The 
single ticket price for a 10-stage trip is for example $0.90 on an ordinary bus, but 
$1.20 on air-conditioned buses, when paid cash. On average, the surcharge for air-
conditioned buses is about 25 on top of the ordinary bus fare. There is also a 
surcharge on express buses in Singapore. A 10-stage trip with express buses costs 
$1.60, i.e. about 33 percent more than ordinary, air-conditioned stage buses. The 
express bus services are part of an effort to improve public transport services. 
Although the price difference between express and ordinary bus services is 
significant, some passengers pay willingly for the faster service. Exceptions are the 
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unemployed and others with lower income, who tend to be more price sensitive and to 
prefer the slower and less expensive alternative. Given Singapore's hot and humid 
climate most passengers are happy to pay the mark-up for air-conditioned bus 
services. 
 
London's public transport fares reflect differences in quality between bus, tram and 
underground. This is shown in table 3. Bus, which is normally regarded inferior, is far 
cheaper than the underground. Tram fares lie somewhere between the bus and tube 
fares. This reflects to some extent passengers' preferences for quick, efficient and 
simple transport on rail tracks.  
 
Table 3: London fares 2003, £ 
Ticket type Bus Tram1) Underground 
Single  Zone 1: 1.00 
Outside zone 1: 0,70 
1 zone: 0.90 
2 zones: 1.30 
Zone 1: 1.60 
Outside zone 1: 1.00-2.30 
Zone 1-4: 2.80 
Day  Zone 1-4: 2.00 (Also valid on buses)
2.80 
(Also valid on bus and tram) 
Zone 1-2: 5.10 (peak) 4,10 (off-peak) 
Zone 1-4: 7.00 (peak) 4.50 (off-peak) 
Month Zone 1-4: 32.70  Zone 1-2: 75.30 
Zone 1-4: 109.10 
1) The tram fare was merged with the bus fare after this information was gathered. 
 
In Athens, bus and trolley bus tickets are cheaper than tram tickets, which again are 
cheaper than Metro tickets. This applies to standard single tickets in the urban area. 
While a bus ticket costs €0.45, the tram fare is €0.60 and the Metro ticket costs €0.75. 
(One metro line has a zone based fare ranging from €0.60 to 0.75.) The difference in 
price between bus and Metro is greater when it comes to monthly travel cards. The 
bus pass costs €17.50; only half of the €35 for passes which are valid on bus, trolley 
and metro. 
 
Since its opening in 2000 the Metro has been a thriving success, and has achieved a 
considerable market penetration despite the higher fare level. The three Metro lines in 
Athens have a market share of nearly 40 percent in 2005. Passengers are shifting from 
both buses and trolley buses, and opt for the faster, more punctual but also more 
expensive Metro. The tram line, which opened in 2004, is also increasing its market 
share, but its total size is small compared to the total market. 
 
Although Athens' fare structure is a result of numerous governmental decisions, the 
higher Metro fare contributes to increased cost recovery. In fact Attiko Metro 
passenger receipts cover all operating costs. 
 
 
 
 16 Insert book title here 
 
 
Rebates on pre-sold tickets 
Helsinki, Singapore and Oslo have introduced two-tiered tariffs on certain ticket 
types. The same ticket is sold at different prices depending on where or how it is 
being sold. A ticket sold onboard from the bus/tram driver is considerably more 
expensive than pre-sold tickets and tickets bought on ticket machines. A single ticket 
in Helsinki costs €2 from the driver, but only €1.20 when bought in advance. A single 
ticket inn Oslo costs NOK 30 from the driver and NOK 20 when sold in advance. The 
cash price of single tickets in Singapore lies about 15 percent above the price when 
paid by the ez-link card. 
 
These two-tired tariffs give a strong signal to the passengers. Ticket sale from the 
driver takes time and causes delay. Other passengers bear this cost in terms of 
increased travel and waiting time and poor punctuality. There is also a cost to the 
operator because ticket sale on board reduces average operating speed. 
 
The take-up of the contactless smartcard in Singapore has been substantial, as it 
makes little sense for most passengers to pay a higher price for cash fares. The shift 
has sped up boarding and alighting and reduced waiting times at bus stops 
substantially. 
 
Oslo Metro reports that one year after the implementation of the two-tier tariff, nearly 
two thirds of the single tickets are being purchased in advance. Before 
implementation, 15.5 percent of tickets purchased were single tickets. Post 
implementation this share is reduced to 12.8 percent; 7.9 percent advance purchase 
and 4.9 percent on board. The sale of single tickets from the driver has in other words 
been halved. Further, the two-tired tariff has contributed to substantial benefits in 
terms of improved punctuality and speeds. One study (StatkraftGrøner 2003) indicate 
that boarding and exit times on a tram line was reduced substantially. Before 
implementation the average boarding time was 4.5 seconds per passengers. Post 
implementation this was reduced to 2.7 seconds. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Numerous cities experience public transport subsidies that are less than optimal. They 
depend heavily on ticket revenues to finance public transport operations. Efficient 
pricing strategies are those that minimise the welfare loss caused by this budget 
constraint, such that fare levels reflect and combine the relevant cost and demand 
structures. 
 
Price differentiation increases the gap between highest and lowest price per trip. 
Different passengers pay different prices depending on their demand characteristics 
and depending on the operating cost of serving them. Given the political decision in 
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many cities to reduce public transport subsidies below optimal levels, we have shown 
that 
• More flexible pricing strategies can be applied in order to increase revenues 
while at the same time maintain patronage 
• The average fare level need not increase when price differentiation is 
introduced. Peak surcharges can, for example, be matched with off-peak 
and/or other targeted rebates 
• A uniform fare structure is not optimal because it doesn’t take into account 
differences in operating cost and differences in passengers’ willingness to pay 
With season tickets the cost to the passenger of an extra trip is zero. The cost to the 
operator is, however, typically high because season ticket holders are more likely to 
be commuters and students travelling during the peak. This pricing policy is not 
efficient because the most expensive passengers to serve are given the largest rebates.  
 
There is a risk that too much price differentiation is regarded as unfair and too 
complex. Here lies a challenge to the public relations officers, who have the potential 
of earning a lot of goodwill from price differentiation. From other sectors, including 
rail and aviation, it is evident that customers appreciate increased freedom to choose 
between price and quality combinations. 
 
There is no one and easy answer to what is a correct pricing strategy for urban public 
transport systems. This paper has pointed at some possibilities and potentials for 
improvements in the efficiency of cost recovery. However, a thorough understanding 
of the cost and demand structures is necessary in each case in order to improve the 
fare system. Further, we have not dealt with the fact that public transport fares 
typically are a political compromise between numerous objectives, such as social and 
environmental goals, as well as a tool for financing operations. 
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